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1.  Introduction 
The evaluation of active labor m arket policy (ALMP) in the transition countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe faces serious methodical obstacles. Most importantly, 
studies typically have to rely on nonexperimental data, a feature they share with most 
evaluation studies on measures of active labor market policy in OECD countries. In 
fact, nonexperimental settings are still predominant in any European country study, as 
large-scale – or any  – experimental studies similar to those conducted in the US have 
remained highly uncommon. 
Apart from  this more general drawback early evaluation studies on transition 
countries frequently had to be based on yet inadequate data: certainly, first of all, local 
national statistics offices had to gather experiences in generating data sets. Moreover, as 
the ur ge to evaluate programs already emerged almost simultaneously with the 
introduction of the data sets and the introduction of the policy measures themselves, 
early studies could not exhaust any long-term data. And yet another distinct feature of 
policy evaluation in a transition country is the need to control for the – in early years 
after transition  – quickly changing macro environment, in particular if one aims at 
estimation of individual treatment effects. 
The transition countries of Central Europe display a U-shaped pattern of output 
over the first years of transition, showing an initial contraction in economic activity 
after the onset of reform followed by, in the Polish case, robust expansion (cf. 
Blanchard 1997). The effectiveness of ALMP measures depends – ceteris paribus – on 
the tightness of the labor market and, therefore, on the point on the U-curve where the 
economy is located. Evaluating the effects of ALMP measures administered over 
several years without controlling for the large moves along the U -curve observed in 
Central European transition countries would severely bias the results. 
This study focuses on the evaluation of active labor market policy in Poland, 
with an emphasis on two major points. First, with regard to the implicit missing data 
problem in any nonexperimental evaluation study, we explore the potential of different 
matching procedures to achieve covariate balance, and we demonstrate how in our case 
exact matching methods may in an intuitively appealing way resolve the dilemma of 
constructing an adequate counterfactual. To this end we discuss three stages of a 
matching procedure that is meticulously adapted to the specific nature of the data. Our William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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arguments are illustrated by comparing covariate balance and balance in estimated 
propensity scores – a summary measure of balance – across post-match samples. 
Second, we discuss our evaluation results in detail, confirming earlier results on 
Polish ALMP (cf. Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt 1999, Puhani 1998). We place 
particular emphasis on the n ecessity of considering subsets of the population of 
treatment units in the interpretation of results. We argue emphatically that a careful 
interpretation of results is as important as the devotion of effort to constructing an 
adequate comparison group, an idea that frequently seems to be overlooked in applied 
work. Specifically, we demonstrate that – even though an appropriate matching method 
does control for the relevant variables  – once the comparison group is found, the 
analysis is not complete. Instead, pursuing the estimation of conditional treatment 
effects for appropriately defined subsamples may be useful to avoid otherwise 
misleading results. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief description of the 
data and gives a short exposition of the evaluation problem, showing how matching on 
covariates and/or the propensity score can identify the treatment effect. Section 3 
explains how our matched samples were constructed and to what extent the matching 
methods applied succeed in balancing observable covariates. Section 4 focuses on 
developing our matching estimator of treatment effects, on interpreting treatment effect 
estimates, and on the importance of conditioning treatment effect estimates on 
covariates for interpretation purposes. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Data and Methods 
 
2.1 The Data 
We employ data from the 18th wave of the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS) as of 
August 1996. The PLFS is a quarterly rotating panel introduced in May 1992. The 
distinct feature of the August 1996 wave is a supplementary questionnaire containing 
retrospective questions on individual labor market behavior. From these questions, 
individual labor market histories in quarterly structure have been constructed. The 
individual histories cover the 56-month-period from January 1992 to August 1996. Yet, 
the retrospective data required considerable preparatory work. 
First, out of an initial number of 48,385 observations 11,102 individual labor 
market histories lacked any entry, and were omitted from the analysis. The vast majority William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
 
  3 
of these are individuals who were inactive in August of 1996. From the remaining data 
we had to exclude both treatment participants with too early (before January 1993) or 
too late (after November 1995) treatment spells since in our econometric approach we 
condition on pre-treatment histories spanning one year and look at post-treatment labor 
market outcomes averaged over three quarters. Incomplete spells containing too little 
information were also excluded from the analysis. 
Our analysis focuses on individuals who experienced at least one spell of 
unemployment during the observation period. For both treated units and potential 
comparison units this ensures consideration of individuals potentially eligible for 
participation in ALMP measures offered by the employment offices. Since we focus on 
two distinct ALMP programs, Training and Intervention Works, the resulting samples 
of treatment participants for both measures and their potential comparisons are 
substantially smaller than the initial data set. We discuss sample composition in more 
detail in section 3.1. 
  Secondly, in order to be able to handle such rich data, we had to condense the 
information contained in individual labor market histories. Monthly entries entail, e.g., 
"employed", "unemployed", "receiving unemployment benefits", "maternal leave", etc. 
Furthermore, individual histories indicate whether and when an individual took part in 
an ALMP course. We compress the 30 possible monthly states occurring in the data into 
the three labor market states "employed" (henceforth denoted "1"), "unemployed" 
(denoted "2"), and "out-of-the-labor-force" (denoted "0"). Information on treatment 
participation is stored separately. Kluve et al. (1999) give a more detailed account of 
data transformation and adaptation. The resulting structure of individual spells for 
treatment and potential comparisons will be illustrated further in section 3.2. 
  In our estimation of individual treatment effects we consider two distinct 
measures of Polish ALMP: Training and  Intervention Works 1. For more information on 
institutional details, on ALMP regulations and descriptions of courses we refer to earlier 
papers on the topic (Kluve et al. 1999, Puhani 1998, Góra and Schmidt 1998). For our 
purposes in this study it is mainly important to note the distinct nature of the two 
programs. Training is meant to enhance, or at least sustain, individual human capital 
during a period of unemployment. The Polish Training measure for the unemployed is 
                                                                   
1 A third measure of Polish ALMP, Public Works (=direct job creation in the public sector), has been left 
out in this study for the sake of brevity, and due to small sample sizes. Cf. also Kluve et al. (1999), 
Puhani (1998). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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training off-the-job whose final aim  is raising the unemployed person’s probability of 
re-employment in a regular job. 
  Wage subsidy schemes like the Polish Intervention Works also have a human 
capital enhancing or -preserving aspect. However, the enhancement or preservation of a 
person’s human capital takes place on-the-job. This human capital component of the 
program is thought to increase the chances of a participant to find regular, non-
subsidized employment at the same firm or elsewhere after the end of the program. In 
addition, if there  is asymmetric information about the productivity of potential 
employees, wage subsidy schemes are designed to facilitate temporary job matches that 
might translate into regular and lasting matches at the same firm once the subsidy ends. 
A crucial feature o f ALMP regulation in the reported period, however, was that 
participation in Intervention Works was considered by the law like any other 
employment spell entitling individuals to a new round of benefit receipt, given the 
subsidized job lasted at least six  months. Taking part in a Polish training measure for 
the unemployed did, on the other hand, not entitle a person to renewed benefit payments 
since this training was done off-the-job. 
 
2.2 Matching as a substitute for randomization 
Program evaluation aims at estimating causal effects, i.e. changes in the variable of 
interest that are due to treatment participation. The formal setting is cast into the 
statistical "potential outcome framework" for causal inference based on Neyman (1923 
[1990], 1935), Fisher (1935) and Rubin (1974, 1977). Let us consider a population 
indexed by  i, and let Yi1 denote the variable of interest given individual i participated in 
a program, indicated by  Di=1. Likewise, let Yi0 denote the outcome if Di=0, i.e. if 
individual i was not a participant, and define the single unit treatment effect as Di=Yi1-
Yi0. However, outcomes Yi1  and Yi0  are "potential" in that we can never observe both of 
them simultaneously for one individual. The parameter of interest in nonexperimental 
studies is the mean effect of treatment on the treated population: 
 
(1)  ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( | 0 1 1 = - = = = D = D = i i i i i i D D Y E D Y E D E  
 
The equation shows the inherent missing data problem, as we cannot observe the non-
treatment outcome  Yi0 for treatment participants  Di=1. We thus have to rely on William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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establishing a convincing substitute for E(Yi0|Di=1) in equation (1) in o rder to identify 
the desired parameter. 
  In an experimental study randomization ensures that potential outcomes Yi1 and 
Yi0 are independent of treatment assignment  Di, i.e.  Yi1,Yi0  ^ Di. Hence, program 
participants and comparison group do not systematically differ from each other, 
yielding the expectation of  Yi0 for the comparison group as a substitute for the 
expectation of Yi0 of the treated group. Thus, 
 
(2a)  ) 0 | ( ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 0 = = = = = i i i i i i D Y E D Y E D Y E , 
 
where Yi is the actually observed value of the outcome variable, i.e. Yi=DiYi1+(1-Di)Yi0. 
Thus, randomization ensures identification of the desired parameter D|D=1 from equation 
(1). Randomization also implies an assumption referred to as stable-unit-treatment-
value assumption (SUTVA, see e.g. Rubin 1980): Potential outcomes for each 
individual are not related to the treatment status of other individuals, i.e. Yi0,Yi1  ^Dj  
" i„j. 
  Given a nonexperimental setting it appears appropriate to substitute for missing 
randomized-out controls by constructing a set of potential comparison units for whom 
we observe the same set of pre-treatment covariates Xi as for the treated units. The 
following proposition given in Rubin (1977) extends the above framework to 
nonexperimental studies: 
 
If for each unit we observe a vector of covariates Xi, and Yi0,Yi1^Di|Xi holds " i, 
then the population treatment effect for the treated D|D=1 is identified: it is equal 
to the treatment effect conditional on covariates and assignment to treatment 
D|D=1,X  averaged over the distribution X|Di=1. 
 
Such a construction of counterfactual outcomes can only be sensible if conditioning is 
on variables which itself are not the outcome of treatment participation. Post-treatment 
employment success is a case in point: by matching those individuals who are or are not 
successful, the e ffect of treatment will necessarily be derived to be zero. Similar 
conceptual reservations would hold for characteristics of post-treatment jobs such as 
industry or working hours. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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Consequently, conditional on observable covariates assignment to treatment can 
be considered as having been random, and unobservable characteristics possibly 
influencing treatment participation are ruled out. In fact, by this proposition comparing 
a program participant with a comparison individual displaying the same observable 
characteristics is like comparing the two in a randomized experiment. We thus merely 
need to estimate E(Yi0 | Xi, Di=0), so that 
 
(2b)  ) 1 | ) 0 , | ( ( ) 1 | ( 0 0 = = = = i i i i X i i D D X Y E E D Y E , 
 
identifying the mean effect of treatment on the treated of equation (1) for a 
nonexperimental setting: constructing the appropriate weighted average over conditional 
(on X) no-treatment outcomes mimics randomization by balancing all relevant 
covariates. 
  Ideally, in order to implement a procedure for estimating the conditional 
treatment effect D|D=1,X , we could simply match treated and comparison units on their 
covariate vector  Xi. While exact matching on  Xi achieves an exact balancing of 
attributes, it suffers from the fact that Xi might be of high dimension or contain 
continuously-distributed variables, so that some treated units might not find 
comparisons. To avoid the problem of matching on a high-dimensional Xi, the method 
of propensity score matching has been proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
Define the propensity score as  p(Xi)=Pr(Di=1|Xi)=E(Di|Xi), i.e. the conditional 
probability of receiving treatment given a set of covariates. Then the conditional 
independence result from above extends to the propensity score:  Yi0,Yi1^Di|Xi  ￿ 
Yi0,Yi1^Di|p(Xi). 
  The reduced dimension comes at a cost, however. The propensity score is not 
known and has to be estimated. Also, in samples of limited size, for some i and j it may 
occur that p(Xi)=p(Xj) even if Xi„Xj, resulting in imperfect balancing of the distributions 
of covariates. Thus, the small sample performance of propensity-score matching might 
be quite dismal. In fact, the literature indicates that the trade-off between exact 
matching and propensity score matching
2 is one of truly empirical nature: The decision 
for one approach or the other should depend heavily on the data, e.g. the number of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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observations, the dimension of X, time structure of variables, etc., and certainly it 
should depend on what the researcher believes (and justifies) to be the adequate modus 
operandi in each specific case.  
  Angrist and Hahn (1999) make this point forcefully by stating that existing 
theory provides little in the way of specific guidelines as how to choose between the 
two. On the one hand Hahn (1998) proves that exact matching is asymptotically 
efficient while propensity score matching is not, and concludes that asymptotic 
arguments would appear to offer no justification for anything other than full control for 
covariates. On the other hand Angrist and Hahn (1999) show that in some plausible 
scenarios estimators controlling for the propensity score can be more efficient than 
exact -matching estimators. The latter seems to be valid in particular when cell-sizes are 
small, the explanatory value of the covariates is low conditional on the propensity score, 
and/or the probability of treatment is far from ½. 
  Still, what counts in practice is how well balance is achieved, so that the 
researcher can indeed "compare the comparable" (Heckman et al. 1997). Any matching 
procedure allowing for any distance in either X or  p(X) must be aware of that. And 
including a weak predictor of p(X) into the estimation might be more harmful than 
covariate matching on a reduced set of comparisons. Thus, both Dehejia and Wahba 
(1998) – based on an empirical study – and Augurzky and Schmidt (2000) – based on a 
simulation study  – argue that it is more important to achieve balance of relevant 
covariates rather than painstakingly modeling the selection process.  
 
3.  Analyzing Matched Samples 
 
3.1 Composition of Matched Samples 
For each of the two measures under scrutiny  – Training and Intervention Works – we 
start the construction of matched samples from an initial sample consisting of treated 
individuals and untreated potential comparison individuals, where every observation is 
required to have at least one spell of unemployment. From this starting point we 
subsequently impose stronger restrictions on  X (i.e. enlarge the dimension of the 
matching criteria) step -by-step, in order to obtain three samples of matched treatment-
comparison units for each of the two measures: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2 In practice, matching algorithms are manifold, including e.g. exact matching, matching within calipers 
(fixed or flexible), minimum -distance matching, or optimal full matching minimizing total distance. For William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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Sample A: A comparison unit is matched to a treated unit if his or her labor 
market history is observed without substantial gaps from a year before up to the 
beginning of treatment and from the end of treatment until 9 months later. None 
of the observed individual characteristics is used as a matching criterion.    
 
Sample B: A comparison unit is matched to a treated unit if requirement (A) is 
met, and if he or she is identical in observable characteristics age, gender, 
education, marital status, and region. 
 
Sample C: A comparison unit is matched to a treated unit if requirements (A) 
and (B) are met, and if he or she displays an identical 4-quarter (12-month) pre-
treatment labor market history at the exact same point in time as the treated 
unit.3 
 
Samples (A) through (C) are constructed applying an exact-matching-within-calipers 
algorithm. For all three samples, if a treated individual finds any matching partner 
among the potential comparisons, this observation is retained. All algorithms allow fo r 
an oversampling procedure, i.e. a treated unit may be assigned more than one 
comparison unit. While we could have sharpened the matching criteria in a different 
order, this sequence reflects our conviction that  timing is the pivotal aspect of 
comparison group construction in a transition economy.  
The firmness in requirements (A) to (C) increases substantially. While under the 
weak precondition of Sample (A) no treated unit is lost in the matching process, and 
almost all potential comparisons are used, under requirement (C) some treated units do 
not find matching partners, and the number of matched comparison units is far smaller. 
Thus, algorithm (C) proceeds with replacement: some comparison units are matched to 
more than one treated individual. Samples ( A) and (B) are constructed from potential 
comparison units with replacement, too, but here we use only the join of sets over 
matched comparison units. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
further reference see Gu and Rosenbaum (1993), Rosenbaum (1995), and Augurzky (2000). 
3 We consider 6 age categories, 3 education categories, gender, marital status, and 49 regions, resulting in 
3528 different cells for sample (B). Including a 4-quarter sequence of a trinomial labor market outcome 
variable (cf. section 3.2) increases the number of cells to 3528*3
4=285,768 cells for sample (C). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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Table 1 presents resulting sample sizes, as well as means of relevant variables. 
We observe that there is a reduction in the number of treated units who find matching 
partners from (A) to (C) of almost one third for Training, and almost one quarter for 
Intervention Works. Due to matching-with-replacement, samples (C) contain 
comparison units matched to more than one treated unit. With less than one percent, the 
number is very low for Training, and with approximately one tenth it is also fairly low 
for Intervention Works. Table 1 also shows that Training participants on average are 
better educated, somewhat younger and more likely to be female than Intervention 
Works participants. 
Throughout, we focus our attention on exact matching procedures. In sample (B), 
the number of matching variables is limited, and they are all categorical variables. 
Moreover, exact matching performs quite well: despite the substantial number of cells, 
approximately 9 out of 10 of treated units find a comparison unit. With regard to sample 
(C), our exact matching approach is a very practical device to account for the pre-
treatment employment sequence. Further illustration is provided in the next sections. 
 
3.2 Timing of interventions  
In our preferred sample (C) we require treated and matched comparison units to display 
an identical pre-treatment history. To achieve comparability across samples (A) to (C), 
we impose the requirement on samples (A) and (B) that we observe any history at all in 
the year preceding treatment, although the precise information  what history was 
experienced exactly is not used in matching. Moreover, to allow an assessment of post-
treatment labor market performance, we require for treated units and all comparison 
samples that we observe a post-treatment sequence of labor force status variables in the 
nine months after treatment. In accordance with our preparatory data work, we condense 
the monthly information for treatment units to a sequence of three quarters of a 
multinomial outcome variable (0,1,2) denoting labor force status (out-of-the-labor force, 
employed, unemployed). 
Correspondingly, for those comparison units eventually matched to the treated 
units, a comparable three-quarter post-treatment multinomial sequence of labor force 
status is computed as well, again starting at the exact point in time when the treatment 
spell of the corresponding treated unit ended. Our analysis thus incorporates individual 
treatment duration by conditioning on a complete (i.e. without major gaps) pre-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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treatment labor market history being observed before month "start" and comparing labor 
force status outcomes after month "stop". Thus, treated units and matched comparison 
units are always being compared during the same period. Figure 1a illustrates this 
procedure for samples A and B, in which the timing structure is considered, but the 
contents of individually matched labor force status histories does not matter. Figure 1b 
proceeds to depict the case for inclusion of exact pre-treatment histories in matching for 
sample (C) 
We thus take advantage of the specific nature of the data with monthly 
information on employment status for a 56-month period, considering the exact timing 
of "start" and "stop" of treatment – a feature that is neither common nor possible in 
many studies, even those focussing on duration data. Moreover, given the rapid upward 
moves of the Polish economy along the positive section of its U-shaped curve of output 
between 1992 and 1996, we can assume that labor market tightness has increased in 
Poland in the reported period. Hence, the fact that we are able to compare treated and 
comparison units individually at the same point of time seems particularly valuable. 
  There might be other ways to solve the crucial problem of finding the "starting 
point of treatment" for comparison units. In principle, one could first match on 
characteristics X or the propensity score conditioned on characteristics,  p(X), and then 
directly impose requirements on comparable timing. A procedure following such a 
"partial balancing score" is for instance used by Lechner (2000). It seems more natural 
to us, however, to incorporate timing as a principal component of matching.  
 
3.3 Covariate balance 
In section 2.2 we have emphasized that balance in all relevant factors – observed as well 
as unobserved  – is the principal objective in experiments, and in its observational 
counterpart, the matching approach. In this section we examine whether the particular 
matching procedures we applied here indeed succeed in balancing the distributions of 
pre-treatment covariates between treatment units and their comparisons. Figures 2 and 3 
show the distributions of the two principal covariates age and region for treated and 
comparison units when matching is according to requirements (A) and the analyzed 
treatment is Intervention Works. By contrast to sample (A), samples (B) and (C) match 
on these individual characteristics. The figures illustrate by how much matching on the 
correct timing alone would miss out on balancing individual characteristics. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
 
  11 
Figure 2 shows that if not accounting for age, the young would be over-
represented among the comparisons, and the mature (35-50, say)  workers would be 
over-represented among the treated units.  
Figure 3 plots the frequency distribution for the 49 Polish voivodships. Including 
regional indicators among the matching covariates is firmly advocated by Heckman et 
al. (1997) in order to control for the local labor market. This is the more imperative in 
the Polish case, since local labor market conditions are quite heterogeneous in any 
typical transition country. The matching criteria for samples (B) and (C) achieve 
complete balance – besides oversampling of comparison units – in the distribution of 
voivodships for treated and comparison units, while sample (A) displays considerable 
imbalance. Thus, if regional information were left out of the matching algorithm, 
regional balance would not be assured. 
  With respect to further socio-demographic characteristics, 59.6% of Intervention 
Works participants are male, while there are only 47% men in comparison sample (A). 
Regarding the three education categories, the middle category comprises 63.6% of 
Intervention Works participants, and there is only one single individual out of the 275 
treated (=0.36%) in the top category. Among comparison units in (A), 2.4% and 78.4% 
are in the top and middle categories, respectively. Table 1 shows that sample (B) and in 
particular sample (C) achieve balance in terms of sex and education. 
 
3.4 Pre -Treatment Histories 
The literature on program participation has always been concerned with the focal 
problem of controlling for observable characteristics, unobserved heterogeneity, and 
selection bias. Mainly affecting a difference-in-differences estimation approach, 
Ashenfelter (1978) pointed to a potentially serious limitation of this procedure when he 
observed a relative decline in pretreatment earnings for participants in subsidized 
training programs. This empirical regularity has been called "Ashenfelter's dip" and has 
been confirmed by subsequent analyses of many other training and adult education 
programs (cf. Bassi 1983, Ashenfelter and Card 1985, LaLonde 1986, Heckman, 
LaLonde, and Smith 1999). For instance, Ashenfelter and Card (1985) apply a model 
that focuses on earnings changes as the determinants of participation. This line of 
thought was a natural consequence of Ashenfelter's discovery and resulted in analyses 
using earnings histories to eliminate differences between participants and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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nonparticipants
4. Clearly, the fact whether the pre-program earnings dip is transitory or 
permanent determines what would have happened to participants had they not 
participated, and the validity of any estimation approach depends on the relationship 
between earnings in the post-program period and the determinants of program 
participation (Heckman and Smith 1999). 
  This rather established observation that it is earnings dynamics that drive 
program participation has lately been put into serious question by Heckman and Smith 
(1999), who argue that it is rather labor force dynamics that determine participation in 
an ALMP program. This point had implicitly been made before by Card and Sullivan 
(1988), who analyze training effects conditional on pre-program employment histories. 
Furthermore, Heckman and Smith (1999) argue for a distinction between employment 
dynamics – indicating whether an individual is employed or not  – and labor force 
dynamics, incorporating also whether a nonemployed person is either unemployed or 
out-of-the-labor-force. Their conclusion is "that labor force dynamics, rather than 
earnings or employment dynamics, drive the participation process" (Heckman and 
Smith 1999). Therefore, we extend the "employment history setting" considered in Card 
and Sullivan (1988) to a "labor force status history setting" reflecting also movements in 
and out of inactivity. 
  We consider the 12-month labor market history of every single treated unit 
directly preceding the exact point in time – i.e. month – that the individual entered the 
program. As for the post-treatment outcomes, we condense the monthly information to a 
sequence of four quarters of a multinomial outcome variable (0,1,2) denoting l abor 
force status (out-of-the-labor-force, employed, unemployed). For each treated unit in 
succession, the matching algorithm for sample (C) computes labor market histories for 
all potential comparison units at this point in time and matches those units who  – in 
addition to the correspondence in the other covariates  – display identical "pre-
treatment" histories. For illustration see Figure 1b. 
  Figures 4 and 5 draw the distributions of pre-treatment labor market histories for 
samples (A) and (B) for both In tervention Works (fig.4) and Training (fig.5). 
Representing a 12-month labor force status sequence with 4 quarterly realizations of a 
trinomial variable (0,1,2) yields 81 possible sequences ("0000" to "2222"). For the 
purpose of illustrating the balanced distributions  – and only for that purpose  – we 
                                                                   
4 Heckman and Smith (1999) attribute this emphasis also to the limited data available to "early analysts". William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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classify these 81 sequences into 11 categories (see Appendix A), so that on the abscissa 
the low categories contain "inactive" sequences (mostly '0's), the middle categories 
comprise "unemployed" sequences ('2's), and the high categories represent "employed" 
sequences ('1's). Categories 1, 6, and 11 exclusively embody the straight sequences (i.e. 
"0000", "2222", and "1111", respectively). 
Thus, of the three peaks we observe in most of the graphs in figures 4 and 5, the 
left peak represents the area of "inactive" histories, because histories with a low order 
number contain many '0's. Accordingly, the peak in the middle expresses "unemployed" 
histories, and the peak to the right depicts "employed" histories. In terms of balancing of 
distributions, the picture is almost the same for figures 4 and 5. Both samples (A) and 
(B) display only limited accordance in pre-treatment histories for treated and 
comparison units. The figures also show that treatment individuals in Training are quite 
different from those in Intervention Works. For the Training participants, the fractions 
of "employed" and "unemployed" histories are quite close to each other, while in the 
Intervention Works sample we observe a far larger fraction of "unemployed" histories 
among the treated. Moreover, for both Training and Intervention Works the comparison 
samples (A) and (B) are too "successful" in that they contain too many "employed" 
sequences relative to "unemployed" sequences in order to be comparable to the treated 
units, where "unemployed" sequences dominate.  
 
3.5 Propensity score balance 
The preceding sections were concerned with balance in selected individual 
characteristics. It is instructive to also provide a summary measure of balance, the 
propensity score. While the estimation of propensity scores is usually a principal step in 
the construction of matched samples – with the hope that the resulting matched sample 
displays a balance in all relevant characteristics but no possibility to test this 
presumption – we can use our samples to directly analyze balance in the propensity 
score. Correspondingly, we predict post-match propensity scores for samples (A) and 
(B), based on estimates derived from sample (A). We follow a probit specification with 
interaction terms between some of the covariates, 
 
(3)  ) ( ) | 1 ( 2 1 0 X X X X D ˜ + + F = = R a a a   
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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where F denotes the cumulative normal density function, X is the vector of covariates, 
and  X  ˜ X indicates all relevant interactions across covariates. Regressors comprise 
indicator variables capturing age, education, gender, and region. Moreover, 
corresponding to the condensation of pre-treatment labor market histories into 11 
distinct "types" in section 3.4, there are 10 indicators of pre-treatment history among the 
regressors. Finally we interacted age, gender and education in a saturated fashion. 
  This model is estimated using the treatment units (yielding the value "1") and 
comparison sample (A) providing the "0" observations. Note that we observe both the 
individual characteristics and the pre-treatment histories also with comparison sample 
(A), although this information is utilized only in the construction of comparison samples 
(B) and (C), respectively. The resulting coefficients are employed to predict propensity 
scores in samples (A) and (B). Figures 6 and 7 document the distribution of propensity 
scores in these comparison samples – relative to the corresponding distribution among 
treatment units – for the two measures under study. 
Note that the density for treated units is not scaled relative to the number of 
observations in the comparison pool, so that the figure depicts the distribution of scores 
rather than the proportion of treated units to comparison units. In both figures 6 and 7 
the comparison units gather at the low end of the estimated score. Whereas for 
Intervention Works treated units are distributed rather evenly, with the peak to the low 
end and then slightly declining towards the upper tail, the majority of treated units for 
Training also displays relatively low scores, with an overall distribution quite close to 
that of comparison units. We find relatively little change in balance from (A) to (B) for 
both Training and Intervention Works. For Training the distributions are rather balanced 
– for Intervention Works, however, the substantial imbalance in pre-treatment histories 
clearly finds expression in the score distributions for (A) and (B) that do not yet control 
for this imbalance. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
 
4.1 Distributions of outcomes 
To illustrate the substantial heterogeneity of labor market outcomes following 
Intervention Works and Training, Figures 8 and 9 plot distributions for the post-
treatment employment success for treatment units and the comparisons in samples (A) 
to (C). There are 27 possible labor market status sequences capturing employment William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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performance in the three quarters succeeding treatment (cf. also Figures 1a, 1b). Similar 
to our presentation of pre-treatment labor market histories, we classify these 27 possible 
sequences of 3 quarterly realizations of a trinomial variable into 9 categories for 
illustration purposes. This categorization is outlined in Appendix A. Once more, low 
categories contain "inactive" sequences (category 1="000"), middle categories include 
"unemployed" sequences (category 5="222"), and high categories comprise "employed" 
histories (category 9="111"). Accordingly, in the graphs the left peak depicts "inactive" 
sequences, the middle peak "unemployed" sequences, and the right peak represents 
"employed" histories. 
Looking at the  Intervention Works samples in Figure 8, we find that in all 
samples the "unemployed" sequences are clearly predominant for the treated units. At 
the same time, comparison units display rather successful labor market histories in 
samples (A) and (B). For our preferred comparison sample (C) this picture changes 
considerably, and a larger fraction of comparison units also displays "unemployed" 
histories. However, the comparison group still fares visibly better than the program 
participants. Attributing the most reliable results to sample (C), we would conclude that 
during the 9 months directly succeeding participation in Intervention Works the treated 
units on average were marginally – possibly insignificantly – less successful in finding 
employment than the comparison units. 
For the Training samples shown in Figure 9 we find slightly different results. 
Similar to what we have seen for the pre-treatment sequences of these samples (Figure 
5), the "employed" and "unemployed" peaks have more or less the same height also for 
the post-treatment sequence. But while for samples (A) and (B) the "employed" peak is 
higher for comparison units than for treated units, and the "unemployed" peak is higher 
for treated units than for comparison units, this relation switches for sample (C). In (C) 
treated units display on average a slightly more successful post-treatment labor market 
sequence than corresponding comparisons. We would thus attribute a slightly – possibly 
insignificant – positive treatment effect to Training. 
  Taken  together, Figures 8 and 9 display three important patterns. First, moving 
from (A) to (C) we do not observe much variation in the distributions for treated units. 
Thus, the fact that we lose some treated units while increasing matching requirements 
does not seem to play an important role. Second, without conditioning on pre-treatment 
labor market histories the comparison samples apparently contain too many "successful" William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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individuals – a pattern which we already observed for pre-treatment labor force status 
sequences in Figures 4 and 5. For samples (A) and (B) this would result in a far too 
negative estimate of treatment effects. Third, across comparison units and treated units 
we observe clearly more "successful" outcomes for Training than for Intervention 
Works. This is not surprising, as we noticed a similar relation for pre-treatment labor 
market history distributions (Fig. 4 and 5). 
  In Figures 10 and 11 we address the idea that participation in Intervention Works 
might primarily be a vehicle to renew eligibility for unemployment benefits. Recall that 
according to Polish ALMP regulations Intervention Works renews benefit receipt 
eligibility, whereas Training does not. Figures 10 and 11 perform a simple before-after 
comparison of the variable "unemployment benefit receipt" for both ALMP measures, 
and for men and women separately. The top panel of each figure indicates benefit 
receipt in at least two of the three months directly  preceding treatment. The middle 
panel shows benefit receipt in at least two of the  three months directly  succeeding 
treatment. The bottom panel plots benefit receipt in at least two months of each of the 
three quarters succeeding treatment, i.e. at least 6 out of 9 months. We focus on sample 
(C) for both measures. 
Figure 10 shows for Intervention Works that a substantial fraction of both 
treated and comparison units received pre-treatment benefits, although benefits do seem 
to play a more important role for treated units. This pattern is more pronounced for men. 
In the  middle and bottom  panel this situation aggravates substantially. While both 
short-term and medium-term benefit receipt played a minor role for comparison units, 
we observe that approximately 60% of the treated males received unemployment 
benefits in the quarter directly following treatment, and that more than half of the 
treated males received benefits during the whole 9 -month post-treatment period. For 
females, this pattern is not quite as severe, but still post-treatment benefit receipt plays a 
major role for Intervention Works participants. 
The situation for the Training sample is quite different. As Figure 11 shows, 
unemployment benefits do play some role for both treated and comparison units during 
the one quarter directly before and after participation, at least for the males. However, in 
the medium run this effect diminishes, and only very few observations in the treatment 
and comparison group display benefit receipt for the whole 9 -month period following 
treatment. This pattern is even less pronounced for women than for men. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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As a result, figures 8 through 11 indicate that individuals involved in Training 
measures seem to be generally more successful before and after the treatment than those 
participating in Intervention Works. However, these patterns are difficult to reconcile on 
the basis of a more favorable impact of Training. Rather, this simple evidence suggests 
that substantial benefit churning seems to take place in the case of Intervention Works, 
but not in the case of Training.  
 
4.2 Treatment effect estimation 
Our aim is to identify treatment effects of two different measures of Polish active labor 
market policy, Intervention Works and Training, which we consider separately in the 
empirical analysis. For purposes of the formal exposition of our estimation approach we 
consider a single generic intervention. Furthermore, we explicitly require that treated 
units be matched with comparison units from the identical set of observed pre-treatment 
and post-treatment months. Any reference to the time period is therefore omitte d from 
the formal exposition as well.  
In addition to the terminology introduced in section 2, let N1 denote the number 
of treated units, with indices i ˛ I 1, and  N0 the number of potential comparison units, 
with indices i ˛ I0. Potential labor market outcomes in post-treatment quarter q (q = 1, 
2, 3) are denoted by 
1
qi Y , if individual i received treatment, and by 
0
qi Y , if individual i did 
not receive treatment. Outcomes are defined as multinomials with three possible 
realizations ('0'=out-of-the-labor-force, '1'=employed, '2'=unemployed), extending the 
formulations of Card and Sullivan (1988) from a binomial to a trinomial setting.  
We can only observe one of the two potential outcomes 
1
qi Y  and 
0
qi Y  for a given 
individual. This actual outcome is denoted by  Yqi. The objective is then to formally 
construct an estimator of the mean of the unobservable counterfactual outcome 
E(
0
qi Y |Di=1). Following the quarterly sequence of labor market outcomes might be too 
detailed, though, for a direct economic interpretation of results. Thus, to condense the 
available information further, the post-intervention labor market success of each 
individual  i is summarized by the individual ’s average employment rate over the three 
quarters following the intervention. Using indicator function  1(.), these employment William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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rate outcomes are  ￿ =
q
qi Y ) 1 (
3
1 1 .
5  Observed outcomes for individual  i can then be 
written as 
 
(4)  , ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( (
3
1 ) 1 (
3
1 0 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ = - + = = = q q qi i qi i q qi Y D Y D Y 1 1 1    
 
and the impact of the intervention on the average labor market status of individual i can 
be expressed as 
 
(5)  ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( (
3
1 0 1 ￿ ￿ = - = = D
q q qi qi i Y Y 1 1    
 
for average employment rates. The parameters of interest in our evaluation analysis are 
weighted population averages over these individual treatment effects, the mean effect of 
treatment on the treated for types of individuals characterized simultaneously by 
specific sets of characteristics X; and labor market histories before treatment hi, 
 
(6)  . ) 1 , , ) ) 1 ( ) 1 ( (
3
1 ( ) 1 , , (
0 1 = = - = = = D ￿ ￿ i i i q q qi qi i i i i D h X Y Y E D h X E 1 1  
 
The less inclusive the chosen set of characteristics conditioned upon  – i.e. the more 
specific characteristics are included in  X  – the larger is the population of treated 
individuals over which the conditional mean is taken. As laid out above, previous labor 
market histories hi are captured by the sequence of labor market states in the four 
quarters preceding the intervention.  
Our approach to combine the population averages of the treatment effects for 
individuals in a given history-specific "cell" – characterized by demographic and other 
characteristics, in particular labor market history – gives us considerable flexibility in 
addressing the economic interpretation of results. The standard approach to evaluation 
                                                                   
5 Kluve et al. (1999) extend this setting to considering both employment and unemployment rates, so that 
corresponding outcomes would be  ￿ =
q
qi w Y ) (
3
1 1 , where w ˛ {1,2}. Comparing employment and 
unemployment rate treatment effects shows for instance that exits to inactivity play a much larger role for 
women than for men. Moreover, Kluve et al. (1999) also consider the medium run, i.e. 6 post-treatment William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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would be to consider the distinction of type-history cells primarily as a device to 
achieve comparability of treatment and comparison units (see below). The ultimate 
interest there typically lies in the average treatment effects over the joint support of X 
and h given D=1, 
 
(7)  ) 1 , | ( = D =￿ D s E w M
s s , 
 
with  s indicating any possible combination of  X and  h, and  ws representing the 
corresponding relative frequency in the treatment sample. By contrast to this standard 
approach, in what follows we will consider appropriate subsets of this joint support. 
How does our particular observational approach  – matching  – facilitate the 
estimation of these parameters of interest? In randomized experiments the 
counterfactual expected values under no intervention can simply be estimated for 
intervention recipients by the mean values of the outcome for randomized-out would-be 
recipients. As we have shown in section 2, matching methods can recover the desired 
counterfactual for a nonexperimental comparison group: Within each matched set of 
individuals, one can estimate the treatment impact on individual i by the difference over 
sample means, and one can construct an estimate of the overall impact by forming a 
weighted average over these individual estimates.  
Matching estimators thereby approximate the virtues of randomization mainly 
by balancing the distribution of observed attributes across treatment and comparison 
groups, both by ensuring a common region of support for individuals in the intervention 
sample and their matched comparisons and by re-weighting the distribution over the 
common region of support. The central identification assumption is that of mean 
independence of the labor market status 
0
qi Y  and of the treatment indicator  Di, given 
individual observable characteristics. In our specific application these conditioning 
characteristics are the demographic and regional variables  Xi and the pre-treatment 
history hi, i.e. from equation (2) in our case, 
 
(8)  . ) 0 , , ) 1 ( ( ) 1 , , ) 1 ( (
0 0 = = = = = i i i qi i i i qi D h X Y E D h X Y E 1 1  
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Thus, by conditioning on previous labor market history we exploit the longitudinal 
nature of our data.  
In a standard difference-in-differences approach pre-treatment and post-
treatment outcomes are typically treated symmetrically; the identifying assumption is 
that the change in outcomes that treated individuals would have experienced had they 
not received treatment, would have been the same change – on average – that untreated 
individuals experience during the same period. This assumption accounts for the      
phenomenon that treatment units typically experience lower pre-treatment outcomes, 
even though they might be otherwise identical to comparison units. It does not lend 
itself naturally to the analysis of categorical outcome variables, though. In this context, 
a natural generalization of the difference-in-differences idea is to condition on the 
specific realization of the outcome variable in the pre-treatment period, as we do here. 
This is possible, since due to the categorical nature of the outcome the conditioning 
remains tractable. Card and Sullivan (1988) and Heckman et al. (1997) advocate such 
difference-in-differences approaches (cf. also Schmidt 1999).  
Our matching estimator is one of oversampling exact covariate matching within 
calipers, allowing for matching-with-replacement. Our particular attention to p re-
treatment labor market histories implements this idea of a generalized difference-in-
differences juxtaposition between treated units and comparison units. Due to the 
relevance of the previous history for subsequent labor market success  – state 
dependence is one of the issues most discussed in the labor literature  – we also 
emphasize this variable in the construction of the estimates. Specifically, for any 
treatment history h for which at least one match could be found, we estimate the impact 
of the intervention by 
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where  N1h is the number of individuals with history  h who receive the intervention 
( ￿ =
h h N N 1 1 ),  I1h is the set of indices for these individuals,  C(Xi) defines the caliper 
for individual i's characteristics Xi, and ni0 is the number of comparisons with history h 
who are falling within this caliper, with the set of indices for comparison-individuals 
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with history  h being  I0h. The standard error of the estimated treatment effect is then 
constructed as a function of the underlying multinomial probabilities. This procedure is 
outlined in Appendix B.  
The overall effect of the intervention is estimated in a last step by calculating a 
weighted average over the history-specific intervention effects, 
 
(10)  , ˆ ˆ
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using the treated units' sample fractions as weights. The variance is derived as the 
corresponding weighted average of the history-specific variances. 
 
4.3 Treatment effect results 
In this section we analyze the treatment effect estimates which we obtain by applying 
the estimator developed in the previous section. Table 2 presents average treatment 
effects on the post-intervention employment rate for Intervention Works sample (C). 
The structure of the table shows how the total treatment effect ( -.126) is being 
calculated by computing history-specific effects first. As explained above, for each 
treated unit, if he or she has more than one matched comparison unit, the comparison 
units' employment rates are averaged and handled as if they were the employment rate 
of only a single unit. The total effect is the weighted average of the history-specific 
effects using the treated units' sample fractions as weights. 
Besides treatment effect calculation Table 2 shows which labor market state 
sequences occurred in the data, thus picking up the theme of figure 4. We observe the 
same predominance of "unemployed" histories which we already noticed in the figure. 
The total treatment effect casts a rather negative picture on the Intervention Works 
program, suggesting that participation tends to lower post-treatment employment 
prospects. In principle, this finding would conclude our analysis: we have described the 
nonexperimental context of the study, we have shown by what means we overcome the 
problem of constructing the desired counterfactual, and we have applied the appropriate 
estimation methods in order to obtain credible treatment effect estimates. As far as the 
data permit, the causal effect of Intervention Works participation is identified. Or is it?  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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  In fact, looking at Table 3 we find that there may be more to it. First, we report 
treatment effect estimates for comparison samples (A) and (B) obtained by taking 
sample averages over the average employment rate in the three post-treatment quarters. 
The estimates are far more negative than the one obtained using sample (C), clearly 
reflecting the over-representation of "successful" labor force status sequences in the 
respective comparison samples (cf. Fig. 4 and 8). Furthermore, in accordance with our 
discussion of expression (7), in Table 3 we subdivide the matched Intervention Works 
comparison sample (C) with respect to various covariates, and we compare the 
conditional treatment effect for the subsample to the full sample estimate. Even a simple 
subdivision by gender reveals an interesting finding: The significantly negative full 
sample effect consists of a  – more or less – zero treatment effect for women and a 
considerably larger negative effect for men. On the other hand, a subdivision by date of 
program entry that parts the observation period into two halves does not reveal any 
apparent influence of changes in the macroeconomic environment.  
The next step is to further refine cells and to classify the sample by both gender 
and date of program entry. These subsamples indicate that post-treatment employment 
prospects for male Intervention Works participants were quite unfavorable in the second 
period after July 1994, but particularly severe during the first period until June 1994. 
For women the time period distinction leads to the opposite result, but both the positive 
effect of the first half and the negative effect of the second half are small and 
insignificant. This also points to the fact that, as we increase the number of 
subdivisions, subsample sizes decrease and standard errors increase.  
  Classification by labor market history allows us to look at the two major labor 
force status sequences that drive the peaks from Figures 4 and 5. For "employed" (1111) 
histories subsample sizes are rather small and the effects not well defined. For the 
subsample of "unemployed" (2222) histories, which entails almost 80% of total treated 
and comparison units, we find a significantly negative treatment effect close to the full 
sample effect. This is certainly no surprise, as the estimate of the full sample effect is 
dominated by the "2222" subsample effect. If we further classify by labor market 
history and gender, treatment effects for the "1111" subsample remain insignificant for 
both men and women, while the "2222" subsample displays the same substantial 
male/female difference in the treatment effect that we have seen for the full sample. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
 
  23 
  Table 4 reports the same comparison between samples and various subdivisions 
for Training. Both treatment effect estimates from comparison samples (A) and (B) 
suggest an insignificantly negative effect of Training participation, while the estimate 
obtained from sample (C) indicates that Training raises the individual employment 
probability by 13.8%. This sudden switch of signs is in line with our observations 
drawn from Figure 9. Further looking at comparison sample (C), we conclude that in the 
case of Training a classification by gender does not seem to add any insights to the 
interpretation: Treatment effects for men and women are almost identical. While a 
categorization by gender and date of program entry shows contradictory results (upward 
for men, downward for women from one period to the other), the number of 
observations per subsample is in fact too small to draw any firm conclusions. Looking 
at a classification by labor market history, once more we find the "peaks" from Figure 5, 
indicating here that the share of "1111" sequences is almost as large as the that of 
"2222" sequences. Again, subsample sizes are quite small for interpretation purposes. 
From these calculations results the observation that an appropriate subdivision of 
a matched sample can substantially contribute to disentangling and identifying 
heterogeneous treatment effects. In particular, the example of a simple classification by 
gender for the Intervention Works sample is striking: The overall negative effect is 
almost exclusively due to the dismal post-treatment labor market performance of male 
participants. Thus, while the recognition of the principal idea that treatment effects are 
heterogeneous across the population has led to the development of sophisticated 
econometric methods for constructing convincing  counterfactuals, it is easy to forget 
the necessity to stratify the sample appropriately in order to interpret the results in 
economically meaningful terms. Thus, controlling for observable characteristics in 
establishing the statistical model does not seem to be sufficient – it appears to be good 
advice to re-consider the same observable characteristics (which we already controlled 
for) when analyzing the empirical results. This recommendation seems imperative if one 
wants to assess for example targeting issues: bad targeting of programs is often claimed 
to be one reason for disappointing treatment effects. In our particular application, 
Intervention Works has been uncovered as an extremely disappointing measure in the 
case of men  – a result that would have remained hidden, had we not pursued an 
appropriate sample split.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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  Of course, these negative treatment effects could be explained by other factors 
than poor targeting. Stigma is often given as a reason why participants of an 
employment program like Intervention Works perform worse in the labor market than 
non-participants.6 Prospective employers identify p articipants as "low productivity 
workers" and are not willing to accept them into regular jobs. Another explanation, 
which might have particular merit in the Polish case, is benefit churning. Workers with 
long unemployment spells who have difficulty finding regular employment are 
identified by labor bureau officials and might only be chosen for participation in an 
employment scheme so that they re-qualify for another round of benefit payment.  
While the presented evidence cannot pinpoint precisely the cause underlying the 
poor labor market performance of males participating in Intervention Works, 
stigmatization seems to be the least likely cause. For if participation in the scheme was 
a bad signal to prospective employers, it is not clear why this would not be the case for 
female participants. It may be that those males – males are for the most part heads of 
households – are targeted by labor bureau officials who have especially poor prospects 
for regular employment. Once the publicly subsidized job comes to  an end, so officials 
might reason, they at least qualify for another round of unemployment benefits, if they 
cannot find regular employment elsewhere or if their subsidized job is not transformed 
into a regular job. It is probably not a mere coincidence that the large majority of 
Intervention Works jobs lasts six months, the length of time one needs to work within 
the year preceding benefit receipt in order to qualify for unemployment benefits. 
However, more work is needed to determine firmly the factor(s)  that drive the 
poor labor market performance of males after their participation in Intervention Works 
comes to an end. For example, the fate of female participants after the end of the 
subsidized job needs to be more thoroughly analyzed. Specifically, one needs to ask 
whether female participants are more likely to be kept on by employers or whether they 
find regular jobs elsewhere more readily than men because their characteristics are 
better than those of men, i.e. because the targeting criteria are different for men and 
women. It could also be that women who participate in Intervention Works are selected 
into jobs that are more conducive to prolonged job matches because demand in these 
jobs is strong (e.g. nursing jobs).      
                                                                   
6 A large part of the intervention works jobs are actually in the public domain, i.e. we can also think of 
this scheme as a public employment program. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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  In addition to displaying the treatment effects by sample and subdivision, Table 
5 presents treatment effect estimates for comparison samples (C) obtained from a 
"counterfactual experiment". The first line reports the factual Intervention Works 
treatment effect estimate computed as shown in Table 2. This estimate tries to answer 
the question: "How much did Intervention Works participants benefit from participating 
in Intervention Works?" The second line reports a "counterfactual" Intervention Works 
treatment effect for Training partici pants, i.e. it tries to answer the question: "How much 
would Training participants have benefited, if they had participated in Intervention 
Works?" The estimate is obtained by history -wise reweighting the Intervention Works 
sample using the fraction of the treated units in the Training sample as weights. Looking 
at Table 2 this is the same as if for each history the second column contained the 
corresponding number of observations from the Training sample. Apparently, this 
reweighting by labor market history implicitly assumes that there are no relevant 
changes in other elements of X. 
The estimate in the second line of Table 5 shows that, while the Intervention 
Works effect on Training participants still displays a negative sign, the effect is 
insignificant,  so that Training participants participating in Intervention Works would 
have done better than Intervention Works participants themselves. Looking at the 
effects of Training on Training participants and Intervention Works participants, 
respectively, we find the counterpart to this result: Intervention Works participants 
participating in Training instead would have not gained as much from the treatment as 
Training participants themselves. Thus, persons with better observable and 
unobservable characteristics seem to have been targeted for the Training program. 
  The last two lines in Table 5 report differential treatment effects of Intervention 
Works vs. Training. The estimates represent the difference between the difference of 
treated and comparison units in In tervention Works (second to last column, Table 2) 
and the difference of treated and comparison units in Training. Once more, differences 
are taken history -wise and weighted using either Intervention Works participants or 
Training participants sample weights. Both estimates clearly show that Training is the 
superior ALMP to Intervention Works.   
  The methodology used in our paper allows us to evaluate ALMP at the 
individual level. It thus tells us that those persons participating in Polish Training 
programs have better employment prospects than they would have had had they not William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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participated and also that they have better employment prospects than those who take 
part in Intervention Works. The methodology does not address the issue whether 
Training improves the overall performance of the labor market, i.e., for example, 
whether it lowers the aggregate unemployment rate. Even if Training is beneficial at the 
individual level, substitution effects - Training participants just "jump the queue" of 
those in line for regular jobs - could neutralize its impact at the aggregate level. On the 
other hand, the finding that a program is not even effective at the individual level, like 
the Polish Intervention Works scheme, helps us to focus attention on targeting issues 
and/or wrong incentive structures that distort the behavior of labor bureau officials and 
of the unemployed.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have analyzed treatment effects of two Polish measures of active labor 
market policy: Training and Intervention Works. The analysis was based on matched 
samples to overcome the inherent evaluation problem of constructing a credible 
counterfactual in a nonexperimental setting. We have seen how matching methods can 
solve this problem by balancing distributions of relevant covariates. Matching methods 
can be based on exact-covariate-matching, propensity score matching, or a combination 
of both (partial score). We have argued that on both theoretical and above all empirical 
grounds the decision for one approach or the other depends heavily on the data. 
  We have illustrated our own approach to the data by the construction of three 
different comparison samples using exact-matching-within-calipers, imposing 
increasingly stricter preconditions. Figures 1 to 5 have depicted how strong 
requirements, i.e. a more detailed match on observable characteristics substantially 
improve the balancing of covariates, and thus the quality of the match. As long as 
sample sizes do not decrease considerably, such a procedure appears promising. We 
have i llustrated the balancing property of our exact matching approach using the 
estimated propensity score as a summary measure of balance. 
  The estimation of the treatment effect is based on a history -specific generalized 
difference-in-differences estimator. Our estimates suggest that, while Training seems to 
clearly enhance individual employment prospects, Intervention Works participants fare 
substantially worse than their comparisons. This is in line with previous findings (cf. 
Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt 1999, Puhani 1998). However, we do point to the fact William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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that appropriate subdivision of the matched sample can add considerable insight to the 
interpretation of results. In our study, for instance, we find that the overall negative 
treatment effect of Intervention Works is almost exclusively due to the dismal 
employment performance of male participants, while women do neither gain nor lose 
anything by participating. From an empirical point of view, we thus doubt that 
controlling for covariates in constructing the counterfactual is sufficient to account for 
the heterogeneity of treatment effects – appropriate subdivision of the matched sample 
may often add clarity to the economic interpretation. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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Appendix A. Categorizing labor market status sequences 
 
 
Pre-treatment 
 
Category  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
Histories  0000  0001 
0010 
0100 
1000 
0002 
0020 
0200 
2000 
0012 
0102 
1002 
0120 
1020 
0021 
1200 
0201 
0210 
2100 
2010 
2001 
0110 
1010 
1100 
0022 
0202 
2002 
0220 
2020 
2200 
2201 
2021 
0221 
2210 
2012 
0212 
2120 
2102 
0122 
1220 
1202 
1022 
2222  2220 
2202 
2022 
0222 
2221 
2212 
2122 
1222 
2211 
2121 
1221 
2112 
1212 
1122 
1102 
1012 
0112 
1120 
1021 
0121 
1210 
1201 
0211 
2110 
2101 
2011 
0011 
0101 
1001 
1110 
1101 
1011 
0111 
1112 
1121 
1211 
2111 
1111 
 
 
 
Post-treatment  
 
Category  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Histories  000  001 
010 
100 
002 
020 
200 
210 
120 
102 
220 
202 
022 
222  221 
212 
122 
012 
021 
201 
110 
101 
011 
112 
121 
211 
111 
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Appendix B. Calculation of treatment effects and variances 
 
The history-specific treatment effect estimator (9) is based on the differences in average 
employment rate outcomes between treatment and comparison units. One notable 
element of this estimator is that multiple comparison units matched to a single treated 
unit (due to the oversampling algorithm) are handled as if they were one single 
comparison unit. The variance for (9) is then composed of the sum of independent 
single variances of each of the employment rate averages entering (9) for "individual" 
treated and comparison units. This appendix illustrates the generic cal culation of this 
individual variance, and how this yields variances for (9) and (10). 
Within each stratum  – defined by pre-treatment labor market history  – 
employment success in the three post-treatment quarters is summarized by the average 
employment rate 
3
1 ￿ . For the unrestricted multinomial model each of the  3
3=27 
possible outcomes is associated with a separate probability. For instance, conditional on 
the k-th history the probability to be employed in all subsequent quarters is  ) | 111 ( k h p , 
the probability to be employed in the first and unemployed in the following two quarters 
is  ) | 122 ( k h p , the probability to be unemployed in the first two and out-of-the-labor-
force in the third quarter is  ) | 220 ( k h p  etc. Let us order the 27 probabilities in the 
following way 
 
0
3
1
= ￿
 
3
1
3
1
= ￿
 
3
2
3
1
= ￿
  1
3
1
= ￿
 
p(000|hk)=p1  p(001|hk)=p9  p(011|hk)=p21  p(111|hk)=p27 
p(002|hk)=p2  p(021|hk)=p10  p(211|hk)=p22   
p(020|hk)=p3  p(201|hk)=p11  p(101|hk)=p23   
p(200|hk)=p4  p(221|hk)=p12  p(121|hk)=p24   
p(022|hk)=p5  p(010|hk)=p13  p(110|hk)=p25   
p(202|hk)=p6  p(012|hk)=p14  p(112|hk)=p26   
p(220|hk)=p7  p(210|hk)=p15     
p(222|hk)=p8  p(212|hk)=p16     
  p(100|hk)=p17     
  p(102|hk)=p18     
  p(120|hk)=p19     
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where  ￿ = - =
26
1 27 1
m m p p . Then, for each individual i with history k (suppressing the 
subscripts hk for notational convenience) 
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In practice, the  pi are estimated as sample fractions. For the  nh individuals with a 
common history follows 
 
(B3)  h i
h n
E m m = ￿ )
1
(   and  
(B4)  ￿ ￿ = =
i h
h h n n
Var 2 2 1
))
3
1
(
1
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which yields the variance for both elements of the difference in (9). The variance of (9) 
then results from the sum of the two history-specific variances (B4) for treated and 
comparison units. Parallel to the derivation of the overall treatment effect (10) from the 
history-specific effect (9), the variance of (10) is a weighted sum (with squared weights) 
of the variance of (9). 
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Table 1. Composition of matched samples 
 
 
 
    Training  Intervention Works 
    treated  untreated   treated  untreated 
           
Initial Sample   Observations  121  7177  275  7177 
           
Sample A  Observations  121  6751  275  6757 
           
  age  34.5  33.1  36.3  33.1 
  %education
a  91.7  80.7  64.0  80.7 
  %female  56.2  53.0  40.4  53.0 
  %married  66.9  65.8  67.6  65.6 
           
Sample B  Observations  114  983  244  1354 
           
  age  34.0  33.0  36.0  34.7 
  %education  93.9  98.9  69.3  87.4 
  %female  56.1  62.1  40.6  51.9 
  %married  65.8  23.2  70.5  77.8 
           
Sample C  Observations  87  111  212  240 
  [Individuals]
b    [110]    [211] 
           
  age  33.4  33.8  36.0  35.2 
  %education  96.6  97.3  71.2  74.2 
  %female  58.6  64.8  42.0  44.6 
  %married  67.8  70.3  70.3  70.4 
 
a Excluding individuals with only primary school attainment or less. 
b Number of observations that the algorithm matched exactly once. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
 
  35 
Table 2. Average post-treatment employment rate treatment effect by pre-
treatment labor market history for comparison sample C – Intervention Works  
 
 
      treated units        comparison units         
job history    N  rate
a  std.err.    N  rate  std.err.    effect
b   std.err. 
0000    5  0.333  0.189    6  0.400  0.219    -0.067  0.289 
0002    1  0.000  0.000    1  0.667  0.471    -0.667  0.471 
1111    16  0.813  0.098    19  0.729  0.111    0.084  0.148 
1112    5  0.467  0.202    6  0.167  0.167    0.300  0.262 
1122    6  0.222  0.150    6  0.333  0.192    -0.111  0.244 
1222    4  0.500  0.250    4  0.833  0.186    -0.333  0.312 
2000    1  1.000  0.000    1  0.000  0.000    1.000  0.000 
2111    1  1.000  0.000    1  1.000  0.000    0.000  0.000 
2211    4  0.167  0.144    4  0.667  0.236    -0.500  0.276 
2221    1  0.000  0.000    1  0.333  0.471    -0.333  0.471 
2222    168  0.183  0.027    191  0.333  0.036    -0.150  0.045 
totalc    212        240        -0.126  0.040 
 
 
a Average employment rate in the three po st-treatment quarters. 
b Difference between rates of treated units and matched comparison units. 
c Total effect is the weighted average of the effects for the individual histories using the treated units' 
sample fractions as weights. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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Table 3. Average post-treatment employment rate treatment effect for subsamples 
– Intervention Works 
 
 
 
Subdivision by 
 
Categories 
 
treated 
units 
matched 
comparison 
units 
 
effect
a 
 
std.err. 
           
Sample A  -  275  6757  -.285  .026 
           
Sample B  -  244  1354  -.291  .031 
           
           
Sample C:  -  212  240  -.126  .040 
           
Gender  Men  123  133  -.236  .051 
  Women  89  107  .026  .062 
           
           
Date of  £ June 1994  116  137  -.135  .052 
Program Entry  ‡ July 1994  96  103  -.115  .056 
           
           
Program Entry &   £ June 1994 Men  66  73  -.295  .069 
Gender  £ June 1994 Women  50  64  .076  .079 
  ‡ July 1994 Men  57  60  -.167  .073 
  ‡ July 1994 Women  39  43  -.038  .089 
           
           
Labor market history  1111  16  19  .084  .148 
  2222  168  191  -.150  .045 
           
           
Labor market history   1111 Men  10  12  .117  .161 
& Gender  1111 Women  6  7  .028  .274 
  2222 Men  100  108  -.258  .057 
  2222 Women  68  83  .010  .072 
           
 
 
a Average employment rate in the three post-treatment quarters. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
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Table 4. Average post-treatment employment rate treatment effect for subsamples 
– Training  
 
 
 
Subdivision by 
 
Categories 
 
treated 
units 
matched 
comparison 
units 
 
effect
a 
 
std.err. 
           
Sample A  -  121  6751  -.027  .046 
           
Sample B  -   114  983  -.048  .049 
           
           
Sample C:  -  87  111  .138  .059 
           
Gender  Men  36  39  .148  .092 
  Women  51  72  .130  .070 
           
           
Date of  £ June 1994  38  52  .212  .088 
Program Entry  ‡ July 1994  39  59  .080  .064 
           
           
Program Entry &   £ June 1994 Men  15  17  .056  .156 
Gender  £ June 1994 Women  23  35  .313  .104 
  ‡ July 1994 Men  21  22  .214  .094 
  ‡ July 1994 Women  28  37  -.020  .086 
           
           
Labor market history  1111  24  34  .071  .115 
  2222  32  43  -.077  .103 
           
           
Labor market history   1111 Men  11  12  .045  .194 
& Gender  1111 Women  13  22  .092  .129 
  2222 Men  11  12  -.046  .192 
  2222 Women  21  31  .093  .116 
           
 
a Average employment rate in the three post-treatment quarters. 
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Table 5. Counterfactual treatment effects for samples C 
 
 
Treatment  Weights  Effect
a  Std.Err.  Interpretation 
         
Intervention Works  Intervention Works  -.126  .040  Factual IW treatment 
effect 
         
Intervention Works  Training  -.048  .064  Counterfactual IW 
treatment effect 
         
Training  Training  .138  .059  Factual Training treatment 
effect 
         
Training  Intervention Works  .089  .083  Counterfactual Training 
treatment effect 
         
Intervention Works – 
Training 
Intervention Works  -.218  .093  Differential treatment 
effect Intervention Works 
vs. Training 
         
Training – 
Intervention Works 
Training  .185  .087  Differential treatment 
effect Training vs. 
Intervention Works 
 
a Average employment rate in the three post-treatment quarters. 
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Figure 1a.    Matching applying a "moving window" in samples (A) and (B) 
 
 
j
a
n
.
9
2
 
 
 
 
j
u
n
.
9
2
 
 
 
 
 
d
e
c
.
9
2
 
j
a
n
.
9
3
 
 
 
 
j
u
n
.
9
3
 
 
 
 
 
d
e
c
.
9
3
 
j
a
n
.
9
4
 
 
 
 
j
u
n
.
9
4
 
 
 
 
 
d
e
c
.
9
4
 
j
a
n
.
9
5
 
 
 
 
j
u
n
.
9
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
trainee #1         ...  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  ...               
                                                                                     
                  1      2      2      2       Training      2      1      1                   
                                                                                     
                                                                                     
                       any history observed                    comparable outcomes                   
                                                                                     
                  2      0      1      0                  2      0      1                   
                                                                                     
1
st control for #1     ...  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  [2  2  0  0  0  2]  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  1  ...               
                                                                                     
                                                                                     
                                                                                     
                  1      2      1      1                  2      2      1                   
                                                                                     
2
nd control for #1     ...  1  1  1  0  2  2  1  1  1  1  1  1  [1  2  0  1  2  2]  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  1  ...               
                                                                                     
                                                                                     
                                                                                     
                                                                                     
trainee #2                                                                                 
                                                                                     
1
st control for #2                                                                             
                                                                                     
2
nd control for #2                                                                           
                                                                                     
3
rd control for #2                                                                           
                                                                           
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 447 
 
  40 
Figure 1b    Matching over identical individual labor market histories applying a "moving window" in sample (C) 
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Figure 2. Distribution of age – Intervention Works  
 
 
Sample A 
 
 
 
 
 
Kernel density estimates of the relevant variable for treated and comparison units by STATA using an 
Epanechnikov kernel and total bandwidth  of (.5). Density estimates are not bound, their purpose is for 
illustration only. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of region – Intervention Works  
 
 
Sample A  
 
 
 
Region = 49 voivodships. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of pre -treatment labor market history by sample  – 
Intervention Works 
 
 
Sample A 
 
 
 
Sample B 
 
 
 
The 34 possible labor force status sequences are classified into 11 categories (see text and Appendix A).  
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Figure 5. Distribution of pre-treatment labor market history by sample – Training 
 
 
Sample A 
 
 
 
Sample B 
 
 
 
The 3
4 possible labor force status sequences are classified into 11 categories (see text and Appendix A).  
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Figure 6. Distribution of estimated propensity score by sample – Intervention 
Works  
 
 
Sample A 
 
 
Sample B 
 
 
 
 
Kernel density estimates  of the propensity score for treated and comparison units by STATA using an 
Epanechnikov kernel and total bandwidth of (.02). Density estimates are not bound, their purpose is for 
illustration only. Y-axis denotes percentages. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of estimated propensity score by sample – Training  
 
 
Sample A 
 
 
 
Sample B 
 
 
 
Kernel density estimates of the propensity score for treated and comparison units by STATA using an 
Epanechnikov kernel and total bandwidth of (.02). Density estimates are not bound, their purpose is for 
illustration only. Y-axis denotes percentages. 
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Figure 8. Distribution of post-treatment labor market sequence by sample  –  
Intervention Works  
 
 
Sample A 
 
Sample B 
 
Sample C 
 
 
The 3
3 possible labor force status sequences are clas sified into 9 categories (see text and Appendix A).  
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Figure 9. Distribution of post-treatment labor market sequence by sample  –  
Training 
 
 
Sample A 
 
Sample B 
 
Sample C 
 
 
The 3
3 possible labor force status sequences are classified into 9 categories (see text and Appendix A).  
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Figure 10. Distribution of benefit receipt by sex for sample C – Intervention Works   
 
 
During 3 months BEFORE treatment: 
 
 
 
During 3 months AFTER treatment: 
 
 
 
During 9 months AFTER treatment: 
 
 
 
 
The upper panel indicates benefit receipt (="yes") during at least two of the last three months preceding 
treatment. The middle panel indicates benefit receipt during at least two of the first three months 
succeeding treatment. The bottom panel indicates benefit receipt during at least two of the three months in 
each of the three quarters succeeding treatment. 
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Figure 11. Distribution of benefit receipt by sex for sample C – Training  
 
 
During 3 months BEFORE treatment: 
 
 
 
During 3 months AFTER treatment: 
 
 
 
During 9 months AFTER treatment: 
 
 
 
The upper panel indicates benefit receipt (="yes") during at least two of the last three months preceding 
treatment. The middle panel indicates benefit receipt during at least two of the first three months 
succeeding treatment. The bottom panel indicates benefit receipt during at least two of the three months in 
each of the three quarters succeeding treatment. 
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